Saturday, May 21, 2011

Following Ahmadinejad-Khamenei Rift, Khamenei Bolsters His Status As Iran's Supreme Leader

In the past two weeks, the Iranian media and the regime institutions have been preoccupied with the head-on collision between Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei over the firing of Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi.

On April 17, 2011, Ahmadinejad fired Iranian Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi, who is close to Khamenei; a few days later, on April 23, he was compelled to reinstate him, on orders from Khamenei. At that point, Ahmadinejad remained secluded in his home for an entire week, suspending his regular activities, while the various regime apparatuses were recruited by Khamenei to clarify to Ahmadinejad that disobeying the Supreme Leader was tantamount to disobeying the Shi'ite imams. Such a move, they said, could cost Ahmadinejad his position, as had happened in the past to other key officials in the history of the Islamic revolutionary regime who had confronted the revolution's leader, "Imam" Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.

It now appears that Ahmadinejad is trying to get back into Khamenei's good graces, while proclaiming publicly that he has always been loyal to the principle of the "rule of the jurisprudent."

In the Iranian media, the rift between the two leaders has been attributed most commonly to personal motives - namely, Ahmadinejad's objections to Khamenei's interference in the political nominations that Ahmadinejad considers to be his prerogative. However, this explanation seems inadequate, considering that the two have for years been bound in a tight political alliance, with Khamenei throwing his full support behind Ahmadinejad during the Green Movement's struggle against him following his 2009 reelection, and also in the struggle against Hashemi Rafsanjani. It thus seems unlikely that they would fall out so completely over Ahmadinejad's dismissal of a minister, no matter how prominent.

Therefore, another explanation should be considered - namely, a profound ideological clash between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, which would remain even if this dispute is resolved. Such an ideological clash might be, for example, over how Iran should respond to the actions of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states in the Bahrain crisis - in which Ahmadinejad might have supported a militant approach towards Saudi Arabia while Khamenei had been passive.

In any case, it seems that this crisis in the Iranian leadership - whether due to personal reasons or ideological disagreement - is of critical importance in Iran's way forward, and in its stance in the region, in the coming months. At present, it looks as though the rift has strengthened Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and consolidated his power and authority in the eyes of the Iranian public, against Ahmadinejad and his attempts to challenge him.

This paper will review the development and ramifications of this leadership crisis.

The Khamenei-Ahmadinejad Power Struggle

On April 21, 2011, the Iranian daily Kayhan, which is close to Khamenei, confirmed that he had chosen to make public his directive to Ahmadinejad to reinstate Moslehi two days after his personal and confidential request to Ahmadinejad to do so was not honored (according to the Iranian daily Kayhan, April 21, 2011). This also followed Ahmadinejad's refusal to invite Moslehi to the weekly government meeting (according to Alef (Iran), April 23, 2011).

It should be noted that Rahim Mashaei, the director of Ahmadinejad's office and related to him by marriage, was described in the media as the one responsible for Moslehi's dismissal, not Ahmadinejad, and was also depicted as regularly disregarding Khamenei's directives. Mashaei is already shunned in the Iranian political arena for past statements expressing sympathy for the Israeli people. Blaming him for the Moslehi crisis was meant to conceal the rift between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei from the eyes of the public.

In an April 23 television interview, Khamenei took the unusual step of acknowledging that he would continue to intervene in the affairs of the Ahmadinejad government whenever he believed the regime to be in danger, and urged the Iranian leadership to remain united, lest its disunity serve Iran's enemies. He said: "In principle, I do not intend to intervene in the affairs of the government... unless I feel that the [regime's] interest is being disregarded, as has happened recently... As long as I live, I will not allow even the slightest deviation in the Iranian people's progress towards [implementing] its ideals" (Website of the Supreme Leader, April 23, 2011).

For one week, Ahmadinejad suspended his regular activities, apparently in protest over Khamenei's interference, and government meetings were chaired by Vice President Mohammad-Reza Rahimi.

Ahmadinejad's associates hastened to explain that his absence was not because he was "sulking" but due to a severe case of the flu. During the week, Ahmadinejad expressed his intention to address the nation on television the following week, and a source in his office said that he had met with Khamenei despite his illness, following Khamenei's April 23 speech, and had reiterated his loyalty to him.

However, journalist Amir-Hossein Sabeti, an Ahmadinejad supporter who writes a column for the Raja News website, noted on April 25 that the president had told Khamenei that he would resume his duties on three conditions: Mashaei's appointment as Ahmadinejad's first vice president, Saeed Jalili's dismissal from his position as secretary of the Majlis Supreme National Security Council, and Moslehi's dismissal from the Intelligence Ministry. Digarban.com, which posted the report, speculated that these conditions were meant to improve Ahmadinejad's standing vis-à-vis Khamenei.

Regime Apparatuses to Ahmadinejad: Obey Khamenei

After Supreme Leader Khamenei publicly announced that he was determined to confront even President Ahmadinejad, whom he had consistently supported in the face of all the rival factions and figures since he was elected in 2005, all regime apparatuses - media, senior IRGC and Majlis figures, and senior clerics, all Ahmadinejad supporters - urged him to obey Khamenei, some doing so implicitly and some directly and bluntly. They warned him that if he did not, he would be impeached, and said that he must submit and pledge his loyalty to the existing order - i.e. to the dominance of the Supreme Leader Khamenei - and not risk creating a bifurcated regime that could result only in fitna (internal war). They stressed that disobeying Khamenei meant disobeying the Shi'ite imams and God himself, and was an act of heresy.

*A. Savyon is Director of the Iranian Media Project at MEMRI; Y. Mansharof is a research fellow at MEMRI. http://www.memri.org. Read more about the clash between Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei here http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/5244.htm.

(c) 2011 A. Savyon and Y. Mansharof

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