In the past two weeks, the Iranian media and the regime institutions have been preoccupied with the head-on collision between Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei over the firing of Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi.
On April 17, 2011, Ahmadinejad fired Iranian Intelligence Minister Heidar Moslehi, who is close to Khamenei; a few days later, on April 23, he was compelled to reinstate him, on orders from Khamenei. At that point, Ahmadinejad remained secluded in his home for an entire week, suspending his regular activities, while the various regime apparatuses were recruited by Khamenei to clarify to Ahmadinejad that disobeying the Supreme Leader was tantamount to disobeying the Shi'ite imams. Such a move, they said, could cost Ahmadinejad his position, as had happened in the past to other key officials in the history of the Islamic revolutionary regime who had confronted the revolution's leader, "Imam" Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
It now appears that Ahmadinejad is trying to get back into Khamenei's good graces, while proclaiming publicly that he has always been loyal to the principle of the "rule of the jurisprudent."
In the Iranian media, the rift between the two leaders has been attributed most commonly to personal motives - namely, Ahmadinejad's objections to Khamenei's interference in the political nominations that Ahmadinejad considers to be his prerogative. However, this explanation seems inadequate, considering that the two have for years been bound in a tight political alliance, with Khamenei throwing his full support behind Ahmadinejad during the Green Movement's struggle against him following his 2009 reelection, and also in the struggle against Hashemi Rafsanjani. It thus seems unlikely that they would fall out so completely over Ahmadinejad's dismissal of a minister, no matter how prominent.
Therefore, another explanation should be considered - namely, a profound ideological clash between Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, which would remain even if this dispute is resolved. Such an ideological clash might be, for example, over how Iran should respond to the actions of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states in the Bahrain crisis - in which Ahmadinejad might have supported a militant approach towards Saudi Arabia while Khamenei had been passive.
In any case, it seems that this crisis in the Iranian leadership - whether due to personal reasons or ideological disagreement - is of critical importance in Iran's way forward, and in its stance in the region, in the coming months. At present, it looks as though the rift has strengthened Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and consolidated his power and authority in the eyes of the Iranian public, against Ahmadinejad and his attempts to challenge him.
This paper will review the development and ramifications of this leadership crisis.
The Khamenei-Ahmadinejad Power Struggle
On April 21, 2011, the Iranian daily Kayhan, which is close to Khamenei, confirmed that he had chosen to make public his directive to Ahmadinejad to reinstate Moslehi two days after his personal and confidential request to Ahmadinejad to do so was not honored (according to the Iranian daily Kayhan, April 21, 2011). This also followed Ahmadinejad's refusal to invite Moslehi to the weekly government meeting (according to Alef (Iran), April 23, 2011).
It should be noted that Rahim Mashaei, the director of Ahmadinejad's office and related to him by marriage, was described in the media as the one responsible for Moslehi's dismissal, not Ahmadinejad, and was also depicted as regularly disregarding Khamenei's directives. Mashaei is already shunned in the Iranian political arena for past statements expressing sympathy for the Israeli people. Blaming him for the Moslehi crisis was meant to conceal the rift between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei from the eyes of the public.
In an April 23 television interview, Khamenei took the unusual step of acknowledging that he would continue to intervene in the affairs of the Ahmadinejad government whenever he believed the regime to be in danger, and urged the Iranian leadership to remain united, lest its disunity serve Iran's enemies. He said: "In principle, I do not intend to intervene in the affairs of the government... unless I feel that the [regime's] interest is being disregarded, as has happened recently... As long as I live, I will not allow even the slightest deviation in the Iranian people's progress towards [implementing] its ideals" (Website of the Supreme Leader, April 23, 2011).
For one week, Ahmadinejad suspended his regular activities, apparently in protest over Khamenei's interference, and government meetings were chaired by Vice President Mohammad-Reza Rahimi.
Ahmadinejad's associates hastened to explain that his absence was not because he was "sulking" but due to a severe case of the flu. During the week, Ahmadinejad expressed his intention to address the nation on television the following week, and a source in his office said that he had met with Khamenei despite his illness, following Khamenei's April 23 speech, and had reiterated his loyalty to him.
However, journalist Amir-Hossein Sabeti, an Ahmadinejad supporter who writes a column for the Raja News website, noted on April 25 that the president had told Khamenei that he would resume his duties on three conditions: Mashaei's appointment as Ahmadinejad's first vice president, Saeed Jalili's dismissal from his position as secretary of the Majlis Supreme National Security Council, and Moslehi's dismissal from the Intelligence Ministry. Digarban.com, which posted the report, speculated that these conditions were meant to improve Ahmadinejad's standing vis-à-vis Khamenei.
Regime Apparatuses to Ahmadinejad: Obey Khamenei
After Supreme Leader Khamenei publicly announced that he was determined to confront even President Ahmadinejad, whom he had consistently supported in the face of all the rival factions and figures since he was elected in 2005, all regime apparatuses - media, senior IRGC and Majlis figures, and senior clerics, all Ahmadinejad supporters - urged him to obey Khamenei, some doing so implicitly and some directly and bluntly. They warned him that if he did not, he would be impeached, and said that he must submit and pledge his loyalty to the existing order - i.e. to the dominance of the Supreme Leader Khamenei - and not risk creating a bifurcated regime that could result only in fitna (internal war). They stressed that disobeying Khamenei meant disobeying the Shi'ite imams and God himself, and was an act of heresy.
*A. Savyon is Director of the Iranian Media Project at MEMRI; Y. Mansharof is a research fellow at MEMRI. http://www.memri.org. Read more about the clash between Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei here http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/5244.htm.
(c) 2011 A. Savyon and Y. Mansharof
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Saturday, May 21, 2011
Do Libyan Rebels Want Democracy?
While the media show Libyan rebels as fighter for freedom, the reality is as more complex. It is not possible to see the opposition as a block, it is built of number movements, most of them with divergent agenda. But first let's look at the groups that compose the rebels, at least the major groups.
National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL)
Formed in 1981 and call for:
democratic government
Free elections
free press
separation of powers among the executive, judicial and legislative
National Conference for the Libyan Opposition (NCLO)
Created in 2005. Their goal is "to put together practical approaches for following up on many efforts made by various Libyan political groups and individuals in their challenge of the Libyan dictatorship" of Muammar al-Gaddafi.
The NCLO doesn't have an agenda for what will happen after the fall of Gaddafi and the creation of a legal mechanism to prosecute all members of the Ghaddafi regime.
Libyan League for Human Rights (LLHR)
Created in 1989. Their goal are:
establishment of a democracy in Libya as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Right
opposition to death penalty
Libyan Constitutional Union (LCU)
Created in 1981. It has for goal:
the return to the 1951 constitution
the restoration of the monarchy
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
Also known as Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya. Formed in 1995 by people who had taliban and Al-Qaeda.
The LIFG may be changing it's name to Libyan Islamic Movement (Irishtime.com, March 29).
After two years of negotiation the LIFG achieved in 2009 an agreement with Libyan security where LIFG stopped it's jihad against Gaddafi regime.
Now LIFG has clearly returned to it's goal to destroy the current regime but it didn't tell it's goal for the future regime. Nevertheless it is possible to deduce their goal from the statement LIFG made in 2009 when it signed the agreement with the Libyan's security. It said that it now views the armed struggle it waged against Col. Moammar Gadhafi's regime as illegal under Islamic law. This point out that Islamic law for libya is within their goals.
The rebel groups have created the National Transitional Council (NTC) that act as the political face of the revolution. The goal of the NTC are to:
Ensure the safety of the national territory and citizens
Coordination of national efforts to liberate the rest of the Libya
Support the efforts of local councils to work for the restoration of normal civilian life
Supervise of the Military Council to ensure the achievement of the new doctrine of the Libyan People's Army in the defense of the people and protect the borders of Libya
Facilitate the election of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution for the country; be put to a popular referendum
Form a transitional government to pave the holding of free elections
Guide the conduct of foreign policy, and the regulation of relations with other countries and international and regional organizations, and the representation of the Libyan people
While every rebel group agree on the elimination of Gaddafi regime, they disagree on everything else. Their differences will appear as soon as Gaddafi regime falls. At the end of the revolution, depending on the strength of each group within the rebel coalition, Libya may go toward a democratic regime or another tyranny.
David Frydman
http://blog.strategy4peace.com
Article Source: http://EzineArticles.com/?expert=David_Frydman
Article Source: http://EzineArticles.com/6161363
National Front for the Salvation of Libya (NFSL)
Formed in 1981 and call for:
democratic government
Free elections
free press
separation of powers among the executive, judicial and legislative
National Conference for the Libyan Opposition (NCLO)
Created in 2005. Their goal is "to put together practical approaches for following up on many efforts made by various Libyan political groups and individuals in their challenge of the Libyan dictatorship" of Muammar al-Gaddafi.
The NCLO doesn't have an agenda for what will happen after the fall of Gaddafi and the creation of a legal mechanism to prosecute all members of the Ghaddafi regime.
Libyan League for Human Rights (LLHR)
Created in 1989. Their goal are:
establishment of a democracy in Libya as set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Right
opposition to death penalty
Libyan Constitutional Union (LCU)
Created in 1981. It has for goal:
the return to the 1951 constitution
the restoration of the monarchy
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG)
Also known as Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah bi-Libya. Formed in 1995 by people who had taliban and Al-Qaeda.
The LIFG may be changing it's name to Libyan Islamic Movement (Irishtime.com, March 29).
After two years of negotiation the LIFG achieved in 2009 an agreement with Libyan security where LIFG stopped it's jihad against Gaddafi regime.
Now LIFG has clearly returned to it's goal to destroy the current regime but it didn't tell it's goal for the future regime. Nevertheless it is possible to deduce their goal from the statement LIFG made in 2009 when it signed the agreement with the Libyan's security. It said that it now views the armed struggle it waged against Col. Moammar Gadhafi's regime as illegal under Islamic law. This point out that Islamic law for libya is within their goals.
The rebel groups have created the National Transitional Council (NTC) that act as the political face of the revolution. The goal of the NTC are to:
Ensure the safety of the national territory and citizens
Coordination of national efforts to liberate the rest of the Libya
Support the efforts of local councils to work for the restoration of normal civilian life
Supervise of the Military Council to ensure the achievement of the new doctrine of the Libyan People's Army in the defense of the people and protect the borders of Libya
Facilitate the election of a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution for the country; be put to a popular referendum
Form a transitional government to pave the holding of free elections
Guide the conduct of foreign policy, and the regulation of relations with other countries and international and regional organizations, and the representation of the Libyan people
While every rebel group agree on the elimination of Gaddafi regime, they disagree on everything else. Their differences will appear as soon as Gaddafi regime falls. At the end of the revolution, depending on the strength of each group within the rebel coalition, Libya may go toward a democratic regime or another tyranny.
David Frydman
http://blog.strategy4peace.com
Article Source: http://EzineArticles.com/?expert=David_Frydman
Article Source: http://EzineArticles.com/6161363
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